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Deliberation’s Demise: The Rise of 
One-Party Rule in the Senate 
 
Charles Tiefer* and Kathleen Clark** 
 
ABSTRACT 
Much of the recent legal scholarship on the Senate expresses 
concern about gridlock, which was caused in part by the Senate’s 
supermajority requirement to pass legislation and confirm 
presidential nominees. This scholarship exalted the value of 
procedural changes permitting the majority party to push through 
legislation and confirmations, and failed to appreciate salutary 
aspects of the supermajority requirement: that it provided a key 
structural support for stability and balance in governance. The 
Senate changed its rules in order to address the problem of 
partisan gridlock, and now a party with a bare majority is able to 
force through much of its agenda. As a result, the minority party  
no longer plays its traditional and vital role in Senate deliberation. 
These rules changes—along with increased party polarization— 
have diminished the Senate’s traditional role as a centrist 
institution, and the nation is suffering from its loss. 
The Senate’s record in 2017 illustrates the danger of 
transforming from a deliberative institution to one where a party 
with a bare majority can force through contentious legislation on a 
straight party-line vote. This recent record may foreshadow even 
more extreme steps. This Article examines the “nuclear option,” 
which was employed to ram through the confirmation of Neil 
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Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, and reconciliation, which was used 
to steamroll substantive legislation on tax cuts (successfully) and 
health care (almost). The Senate has lost its way as a deliberative 
institution and has come to resemble the House of Representatives. 
To regain its stature as a deliberative body, the Senate must 
revitalize the role of the minority party and stabilize its procedure. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: FROM CONCERNS ABOUT GRIDLOCK TO ONE-PARTY 
RULE 
A. Current Senate Concerns 
In 2017, the Senate voted on majority party proposals to 
repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 A small group of senators 
from a single party wrote the proposals behind closed doors and no 
Senate committee conducted hearings. By using a procedure 
known as “reconciliation,” the truly dreadful bill came within one 
vote of passage. Even some majority senators who voted for the 
bill declared that they did not want it to become law.2 The near- 
repeal of the ACA is just one example of the risk created by recent 
changes in the Senate rules: changes that reduce the power of the 
minority party, undercut the deliberation that the Senate has 
traditionally provided, and diminish the Senate’s role as a critical 
check in the legislative process. 
For almost a century, the Senate imposed a supermajority 
cloture requirement for the passage of most legislation and the 
confirmation of presidential nominees.3 To pass significant 
legislation, a party with a bare majority in the Senate had to 
reach across the aisle for support from members of the minority 
party in order to achieve supermajority support. By imposing a 
supermajority requirement, the Senate handed power to members 
of the minority party, who could extract legislative concessions 
from the majority seeking supermajority support.4  This 
procedural requirement fostered deliberation, with sponsors of 
legislation looking for ways either to achieve affirmative 
supermajority support for a bill or to persuade members of the 
minority not to mount an objection. As a result of the Senate’s 
supermajority cloture requirement, a sweeping legislative 
program could pass the Senate only if one of two different 
 
 
1. MJ Lee & Phil Mattingly, Health Care Debate: Senate Rejects Full 
Obamacare Repeal Without Replacement, CNN (July 27, 2017, 2:44 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/26/politics/health-care-bill-wednesday/index. 
html [https://perma.cc/WKX3-4P9L]. 
2. Id. 
3. See Cloture Rule, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/minute/Cloture_Rule.htm [https://perma.cc/59V3-WZKM] (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2018). 
4. See id. 
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conditions were met: either (1) the legislation was supported by a 
majority party that had won a supermajority of Senate seats due 
to an overwhelming electoral mandate, or (2) members from both 
major political parties supported the legislation.5 
The Senate has adopted several key procedural changes 
reducing the scope of its supermajority requirement, with the 
roots of this ongoing change visible as early as 2007, when the 
Senate appeared to be on its way to becoming an institution of 
one-party rule.6 In early 2017, a further sign of this change came 
as the majority party forced through the confirmation of Supreme 
Court Justice Neil Gorsuch.7  The Senate changed its rules to  
deny the minority party a role in deliberation when the majority 
party exercises the “nuclear option.”8 This virtually omnipotent 
procedure could allow the majority party to change in its favor any 
Senate procedure. 
In 2017, the Senate also employed a second technique, 
reconciliation, which enables the majority party to “fast track” 
legislation by greatly reducing the role played by the minority 
party. The majority party planned to push through parts of the 
Trump Administration agenda while allowing only a limited role 
for the minority party. Notably, the 52–48 Republican Senate set 
out to use this technique (and avoid the sixty vote cloture 
requirement) in order to repeal the ACA and enact large tax cuts 
for the wealthy.9 
 
5. See id. 
6. Charles Tiefer, Congress’s Transformative “Republican Revolution” in 
2001-2006 and the Future of One-Party Rule, 23 J. L. & POL. 233 (2007) 
[hereinafter The Future of One-Party Rule]. 
7. Charles Tiefer, The Silencing of Elizabeth Warren, HARV. L. & POL’Y 
Rev. BLOG (Feb. 22, 2017), http://harvardlpr.com/2017/02/22/the-silencing-of- 
senator-warren/ [https://perma.cc/2WBS-6264] (foreshadowing this trend); 
Matt Flegenheimer, The Roots of the Battle over Neil Gorsuch: They Started 
It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/us/ 
politics/supreme-court-neil-gorsuch-senate.html [https://perma.cc/3B4X- 
ZB24]. 
8. Alexander Bolton, GOP Triggers ‘Nuclear Option,’ Gutting Filibuster 
in Gorsuch Fight, THE HILL (Apr. 6, 2017, 12:35 PM), http://thehill.com/ 
homenews/senate/327591-gop-triggers-nuclear-option-gutting-filibuster-in- 
gorsuch-fight [https://perma.cc/6FPX-M2M2]. 
9. Rebecca M. Kysar, Reconciling Congress to Tax Reform, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2121, 2125–36 (2013); Adam Cancryn et al., Senate GOP 
Reveals Obamacare Repeal Bill but Still Lacks the Votes, POLITICO (June 22, 
2017, 7:21 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/22/senate-obamacare- 
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The majority’s “gamble on fast-track rules” to repeal the ACA 
ultimately failed.10 Notwithstanding this particular failure, the 
machinery of Washington governance has largely shifted. In the 
past, the outcome of a bill in the Senate was determined by 
centrists from both parties working together. In this new era, the 
Senate Majority Leader’s goal was for a bill’s outcome to be 
determined by the majority party acting by itself: one-party rule.11 
Through one-party rule, the majority party was able to enact 
an enormous tax cut, primarily benefiting corporations and the 
top bracket. Only Republicans voted for it, and all Democrats 
voted against it.12 That bill also repealed the individual mandate 
in the ACA, which was expected to remove 13 million people from 
health insurance coverage and increase health insurance costs for 
the rest.13 
As the Senate continues down the path of reducing the 
minority party’s role, it comes to resemble the House. In the 
House, the majority party (whether Republican or Democrat) has 
for the last century occupied a dominant position, relegating the 
minority party to a much diminished status.14 There are 
advantages to having a Senate that is run differently than the 
House: balance, consensus, centrism, and stability. Those 
advantages are at risk as the Senate continues down the path 
toward House-like one-party rule. 
In addition, in 2017 the Senate used a third technique that 
reduced the role of the minority party. The Congressional Review 
Act permits a bare majority of the Senate (along with a majority of 
 
repeal-republicans-secrets-239837 [https://perma.cc/6HNU-PC3X]. 
10. Robert Pear, Republican Gamble on Fast-Track Rules for Health Care 
Hits Wall, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/07/26/us/politics/republican-fast-track-rules-obamacare-hits-wall.html 
[https://perma.cc/H5H5-W9ZN]. 
11. The Future of One-Party Rule, supra note 6. 
12. Thomas Kaplan, House Gives Final Approval to Sweeping Tax 
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/ 
us/politics/tax-bill-republicans.html?rref=collection%2Fnewseventcollection 
%2Ftrump-tax-cut-plan&action=click&contentCollection=politics&region 
=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype= 
collection [https://perma.cc/8UDY-GKMW]. 
13. Pear, supra note 10. 
14. CHARLES TIEFER, THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, THE POST-TRADITIONAL 
PROCEDURE OF ITS CURRENT STRUGGLES (UNIVERSITY PRESS OF AMERICA, INC. 
2016) [hereinafter THE POLARIZED CONGRESS]. 
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the House and the President’s signature) to eliminate by 
“disapproval” recently promulgated regulations.15 This technique 
does not require the sixty Senate votes for cloture, just a simple 
majority.16 Republicans made extensive use of the Congressional 
Review Act in 2017.17 
B. Contrast to Fear of Gridlock 
These developments demonstrate the need to reconsider the 
direction of previous scholarship on the Senate. Much of  the 
recent scholarship about the Senate has focused on the condition 
of gridlock and how the Senate needed to overcome it.18 Gridlock 
has indeed characterized the Senate—and Congress as a whole— 
from 2011 to 2016. Both gridlock and one-party rule result from 
political parties’ unwillingness to work together toward 
compromise. But observers who previously expressed concern 
about gridlock should now recognize the troubling consequences 
that have arisen from one-party rule in the Senate, including the 
denial of any role for the minority party and the demise of 
deliberation. 
When a single party has a bare majority in the Senate, should 
that party be able to push through its entire legislative agenda? 
Or should the rules of the Senate require that a bare majority 
compromise with the minority party? 
This is not just an issue of the Trump era. This demise of 
deliberation has developed over time as the Senate has made 
changes to its rules, ratcheting down the power of the minority 
party. One-party rule also stems from the increasing polarization 
of the parties in general, and the Senate parties in particular, over 
the past half-century. The Senate was previously dominated by 
centrist institutional attitudes, including respect for bipartisan 
 
 
15. 5 U.S.C.A. § 801 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-193). 
16. Id. 
17. Michael D. Shear, Trump Discards Obama Legacy, One Rule at a 
Time, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/ 
politics/trump-overturning-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/SP3C-4YMM]. 
18. See Jason S. Oh, Commentary Diagnosing Gridlock, 67 TAX L. REV. 
627, 627 (2014); Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the 
Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2217 (2013); 
David S. Law & Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection, Appointments 
Gridlock, and the Nuclear Option, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 53 (2006). 
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committees, but is now dominated by majority party insistence on 
achieving political goals with zero involvement from the 
minority.19 Changes in the Senate’s internal rules reflect 
increased party polarization. While Democrats are the ones 
raising concerns about a diminished role for the minority party 
right now, Republicans will have similar concerns when, as 
eventually happens, they become the minority party. 
This Article examines recent procedural changes in the 
Senate that have empowered a bare majority to pass legislation 
and confirm presidential nominees without regard for a minority 
party’s concerns. Those who argued for these procedural changes 
contended that they would solve the problem of gridlock. While 
gridlock has been a problem, removing the supermajority 
requirement also removes a key strength of the Senate. The 
supermajority requirement gave the majority party an incentive to 
work with members of the minority party, fostering cross-party 
alliances among senators with divergent viewpoints who found 
ways to work together toward legislative goals, creating a 
legislative body that was not just representative, but also 
deliberative. This Article proposes a framework that would  
protect the deliberative function of the Senate. Rather  than 
wiping out the supermajority requirement entirely, these proposed 
reforms would impose a supermajority requirement for 
particularly sensitive legislative and confirmation battles. 
The Senate has repeatedly made procedural changes that 
ratchet down the power of the minority party and further  
diminish deliberation. But it is not inevitable that the Senate will 
continue down this path, to the demise of deliberation. There are 
alternatives available to the Senate that would strengthen 
deliberation, but these alternatives will be far from easy for the 
Senate to achieve. They require a longer-term leadership 
perspective, determined efforts at centrism among the senators, 
pausing before taking radical steps, and tweaking the 
supermajority requirement to strengthen the institution. 
C. Overview 
This Article builds on an earlier treatise and book on 
 
 
19. THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 4, 6–7. 
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congressional procedure20 along with law review articles 
examining particularly dramatic changes in congressional 
procedure, going back to 2001 and continuing through the 2000s.21 
These writings chronicled developments, such as the use of the 
reconciliation process for passing legislation, which was not the 
original purpose of that procedure. To address gridlock in the 
Senate, these books and articles did not recommend radical 
change (such as the blunt nuclear option), but instead proposed 
limited moderate changes.22 This Article continues in that vein. 
Part I of this Article outlines the ways in which the Senate 
has denied the minority party its traditional role in deliberation 
and the dangers that arise as a result. It describes procedural 
changes that have ratcheted down the power of the minority party 
and the slippery slope toward further changes that the Senate 
appears to be on. Part II provides historical background  on 
Senate procedures. Some of the rules changes together with 
increases in party polarization have made it harder for the Senate 
to function as a centrist institution, and it has moved away from 
balance and stability.23 Part III identifies options that would 
strengthen deliberation in the Senate. Both parties need to 
support procedural steps that will reinvigorate the center and 
provide incentives for the majority party to cooperate with— 
rather than subjugate—the minority party. 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND NEAR-TERM DANGERS IN MINIMIZING 
THE ROLE OF THE MINORITY PARTY 
A. The “Nuclear Option” 
Recent changes in Senate rules have severely cut back on the 
role of the minority party. During the Obama Administration, 
when the Democratic Party held a majority, it made two changes 
 
 
20. CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A 
REFERENCE, RESEARCH AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE (Greenwood Press 1989) 
[hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE]; see, e.g., Jacobi & 
VanDam, infra note 50; THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14. 
21. E.g., Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About 
Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409, 410 (2001) [hereinafter How to Steal 
a Trillion]. 
22. THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 171–81. 
23. Id. at 84–106. 
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to decrease the power of the Senate Republican minority.24 
Most starkly, in November 2013, the Senate Democratic 
majority took action to expedite the confirmation of most, but not 
all, presidential nominees. Senate Republicans had slowed the 
confirmation of President Obama’s judicial nominees to a crawl, 
resulting in a large pool of judgeships left unfilled,25 and had done 
the same to Obama’s nominees for executive posts. This was no 
small thing. This exercise of minority party power was arguably 
an abuse of power because the Senate minority used its power not 
to pass judgment upon the credentials or fitness of individual 
judicial nominees, but to prevent any confirmations for these posts 
at all in order to create and to accumulate long-term vacancies.26 
In the past, both parties had slowed the confirmation of the other 
party’s nominees at the end of a President’s term, but had not 
obstructed confirmations on such a scale. 
In response to this wide-scale Republican obstruction, 
Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid changed the cloture rule 
for confirming almost all presidential nominees. Instead of 
requiring a supermajority of sixty votes, confirmation would now 
require only a bare-majority of fifty.27 Perhaps more significant 
than the rule change itself was Reid’s method of making the 
change. He used a procedure called the  “nuclear  option.”28  
During consideration of a nominee, Reid raised a point of order 
that a cloture vote “‘for all nominations other than for the 
Supreme Court of the United States is by majority vote’” rather 
 
 
 
24. The Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, also obtained a 
compromise standing order as for when the filibuster might be eliminated on 
a motion to proceed, but it did not matter much. John C. Roberts, Gridlock 
and Senate Rules, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2214 (2013). 
25. William G. Dauster, The Senate in Transition or How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Love the Nuclear Option, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
631, 642 (2016). 
26. Id. at 641–45. 
27. Id. at 648. Under Senate rules, the vice president has the power to 
break a tie vote on the floor of the Senate, so a bare majority could consist of 
fifty Democratic senators and the (tie-breaking) Democratic vice president. 
See id. 
28. Jim VandeHei & Charles Babington, From Senator’s 2003 Outburst, 
GOP Hatched Nuclear Option, WASH. POST (May 19, 2005), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/18/AR2005051802144_pf. 
html [https://perma.cc/RW9J-HW3E]. 
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than sixty votes.29  The President Pro Tempore properly ruled  
that the point of order was not sustained. Then, the President Pro 
Tempore put the question before the Senate, and the Senate voted 
forty-eight in favor of the President Pro Tempore’s ruling and 
fifty-two opposed, overruling the ruling. “The Senate had thus 
changed Senate procedure for future nominations. The Reid 
Precedent was set.”30 In plain English, a bare majority of the 
Senate voted to decrease the cloture requirement for all executive 
and almost all judicial nominations from sixty to fifty votes, 
leaving the sixty-vote threshold only for Supreme Court 
nominations. 
The majority party had taken away a substantial minority 
party right. It did not matter whether the minority party became 
willing to act responsibly, to limit its stalling tactics to only 
certain nominees, or even to pledge that it would yield after a few 
days or after a few cloture votes. Rather, the minority party had 
completely lost its right (except for Supreme Court nominations). 
Resorting to the “nuclear option” reduced the unwritten taboo or 
heavyweight reluctance in the Senate to invoke this procedure.31 
But Majority Leader Reid walled off one type of decision as too 
sensitive and significant for such diminished deliberation: 
confirming nominees to the Supreme Court. 
In 2015, Republicans became the majority party in the 
Senate. The shoe was now on the other foot, setting the stage for 
Senate action on Supreme Court nominees in 2016 and 2017.32 In 
March of 2016, President Obama nominated Merrick Garland to 
the Supreme Court. Senate Majority Leader McConnell and the 
Republican Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee refused to 
allow a committee hearing on or floor consideration of the 
nominee.33 They did not contend that the President’s nominee 
 
29. Dauster, supra note 25, at 648 (quoting Senator Reid). 
30. Id. 
31. Law & Solum, supra note 18, at 60–63. 
32. Chris Cillizza et al., Why Republicans’ Senate Majority Could Be Very 
Short-Lived, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/11/07/why-republicans-senate-majority-could-be- 
very-short-lived/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ef2d9ae1ba74 
[https://perma.cc/LG3E-2BZ6]. 
33. David M. Herszenhorn, Mitch McConnell Tells Garland the Senate 
Will Not Act, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016, 4:08 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
live/obama-supreme-court-nomination/mcconnell-tells-garland/ 
 56 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:46 
 
was unqualified or unsuitable. This was about using their power 
to obstruct President Obama and motivate members of their party 
to elect a Republican President in November of that year. 
When President Trump came to office and nominated his 
Cabinet secretaries and other officials, the Senate (Democratic) 
minority party had no ability to weigh those nominations, or 
selectively deliberate over the most unacceptable nominations, or 
even slow them down until the Senate had access to a complete 
record. For example, the minority sought to delay a vote on Scott 
Pruitt to head the Environmental Protection Agency until after 
the release of Pruitt’s emails that had been ordered by an 
Oklahoma judge.34 The majority rejected this delay, and the 
Senate confirmed Pruitt by a vote of 52–46.35 Days after Pruitt’s 
confirmation, the emails were released, and they showed that 
Pruitt had not told the truth about his email practices and 
documented a cozy relationship between Pruitt and anti- 
environment lobbying groups.36 
Betsy DeVos, the nominee for Education Secretary, lacked 
relevant experience and was known as an opponent of public 
schools in favor of charter schools. Her confirmation hearing went 
forward even though information on her extensive finances and 
conflicts of interest was not available.37 The Senate was 50–50 
divided about confirming her, but the majority pushed her 
confirmation through at breakneck speed without meaningful  
time for deliberation.38 
 
[https://perma.cc/9ZEJ-HKPW]. 
34. Coral Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt as E.P.A. Head, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/scott- 
pruitt-environmental-protection-agency.html [https://perma.cc/LKQ3-5CBK]. 
35. Id. 
36. Michael Biesecker & Sean Murphy, Records Show EPA’s Pruitt Used 
Private Email, Despite Denial, NBC WASH. (Feb. 27, 2017, 5:52 PM), 
https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/politics/Records-Show-EPAs-Pruitt- 
Used-Private-Email-Despite-Denial-414907603.html [https://perma.cc/3N2N- 
5UKW]. 
37. Dan Merica, Democrats Won’t Get a Second Hearing with Betsy 
DeVos, Trump’s Education Pick, CNN (Jan. 24, 2017, 3:52 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/politics/betsy-devos-second-hearing- 
democrats/index.html [https://perma.cc/WY53-TJC8]. 
38. Kaitlyn Burton, DeVos Confirmation: How Every Senator Voted on 
Trump’s Education Secretary, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 2017, 1:32 PM), https://www. 
politico.com/blogs/donald-trump-administration/2017/02/betsy-devos- 
confirmation-vote-count-234744 [https://perma.cc/AQ4M-6CC7]. 
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More significantly for Senate procedure, Majority Leader 
McConnell’s refusal to confirm or even consider Judge Garland in 
2016 preserved that Supreme Court vacancy in case a Republican 
won the November 2016 election, as Trump did. Early in 2017, 
President Trump nominated Neil Gorsuch, a nominee in the  
Scalia tradition.39 At his Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, 
Gorsuch refused to disclose his views on virtually any legal 
question, including whether he would vote to overrule Roe v. 
Wade.40 In tone, he was polite and charming. In reality,  he 
treated the Senate as an institution unable to deliberate on his 
(unstated) positions, with the nuclear option in his own back 
pocket. 
Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer announced that 
every single Democratic senator would stand together to filibuster 
the Gorsuch nomination.41 The Democratic base was aroused by 
President Trump’s election and in particular his nomination of 
Gorsuch. Conversely, much of President Trump’s base looked at 
this Supreme Court nomination as non-negotiable because it was 
key to many conservative positions in general and overruling Roe 
v. Wade in particular.42 Neither base left its Senate party able to 
work out a compromise. 
Such a compromise could have been possible; the minority 
party could have let Gorsuch through in return for the majority 
party’s promise not to use the nuclear option for “extraordinary” 
future nominees.43 That would have tracked the compromise for 
 
39. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Mark Landler, Trump Nominates Neil 
Gorsuch to the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/supreme-court-nominee-trump.html 
[https://perma.cc/BA4N-T2KM]. 
40. Matt Flegenheimer et al., Gorsuch Completes His 20-Hour Test. So 
How Did He Do?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/03/23/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-hearing.html 
[https://perma.cc/5ADL-8M76]. 
41. Robert Barnes et al., Schumer: Democrats Will Filibuster Gorsuch 
Nomination, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
powerpost/gorsuch-confirmation-hearing-to-focus-today-on-testimony-from- 
friends-foes/2017/03/23/14d21116-0fc7-11e7-9d5a-a83e627dc120_story.html? 
utm_term=.d56572c6b47b [https://perma.cc/PFZ8-4A5T]. 
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
43. Charles Tiefer, McConnell and Schumer Can Compromise to Avoid 
the Nuclear Option on Gorsuch, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2017, 12:13 PM), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/charlestiefer/2017/04/04/mcconnell-and-schumer-can- 
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lower court nominees that worked for the “Gang of 14” in the 
2000s.44 In 2005, a bipartisan group of fourteen senators 
negotiated a compromise to avoid the “nuclear option” by 
promising a high level of minority deference to the majority 
party’s confirmation efforts.45 Such a deal would have been 
advantageous for both sides, though it would have disappointed 
the extremes in each party. But in light of how strongly their 
bases felt, neither party was inclined to compromise in 2017. The 
Democratic minority did not have the will to relent on Gorsuch, 
and the Republican majority did not have the will to prevent 
confirmation of President Trump’s most extreme Supreme Court 
nominees in the future. 
So Majority Leader McConnell invoked the nuclear option for 
Supreme Court confirmations.46 He obtained the Chair’s negative 
ruling, appealed, and won the appeal for limiting debate on 
Supreme Court judgeships. Gorsuch was confirmed to the 
Supreme Court. In terms of Supreme Court action, the 
confirmation of Neil Gorsuch certainly mattered on its own. 
Gorsuch was a mere forty-nine years old and will likely be a part 
of the Court’s right wing for decades. 
But the way that Gorsuch was confirmed will also have 
lasting significance,47 because the nuclear option will limit Senate 
deliberation over future Supreme Court nominees.48 The prior 
reluctance to use the nuclear option was not absolute, in that Reid 
invoked it for lower court and executive nominees in 2013. The 
Senate had used the same approach—overruling the Chair—in 
previous decades to make a large number of changes to its 
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procedure, albeit most of those changes were minor.49 There had 
certainly been occasions when the Senate majority party changed 
Senate procedures, including some when the minority party 
protested.50 However, those minor adjustments in Senate 
procedure pale in significance compared with the 2013 decision to 
deny the minority party the power to resist executive and lower 
court nominations—let alone the 2017 decision to crush any 
minority party ability to resist Supreme Court nominations. 
Moreover, this change means that when other Supreme Court 
seats become vacant, if the Senate majority party is united, it can 
again confirm nominees without the minority party having any 
right to weigh or even significantly discuss.51 Forty-nine minority 
senators will not have the right to raise an alarm about what will 
happen to the Court. Single-party rule, rather than deliberation, 
will drive Supreme Court nominees to confirmation. 
Future nominees may have views even more extreme than 
Gorsuch’s, with their confirmation shifting the balance of the 
Court. For example, when Justice Kennedy, the median Justice, 
retired and President Trump nominated Brett Kavanaugh, a  
judge considerably to the right of Kennedy, the ideological balance 
of the Court shifted, and the minority did not have the power to 
weigh or delay that nomination. 
B. Reconciliation for Trump Agenda 
There is a significant danger that the Senate will attempt to 
pass large portions of the Trump Administration’s substantive 
agenda using the technique of reconciliation. The reconciliation 
procedure has been used in deficit swelling tax cuts and in bills 
dealing with health care, and may readily serve those ends 
again.52 The Byrd Rule limits how far reconciliation bills can  
stray into non-fiscal “extraneous” subjects.53 For example, the 
 
49. Dauster, supra note 25, at 651–53. 
50. Gold & Gupta, supra note 47. 
51. See Michael J. Gerhardt & Richard W. Painter, Majority Rule and the 
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52. Looking back, “every reconciliation bill from 1980 through 1994 
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Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future of Majoritarian Lawmaking in the 
U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261, 313 (2013). 
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Byrd Rule would keep a provision attacking Planned Parenthood 
out of a reconciliation bill addressing health care finances. On the 
other hand, who knows whether the Senate majority party will 
respect the limits drawn by the Byrd Rule when it is facing some 
all-important moment in the future.54 
More broadly, the recent use of the nuclear option (i.e., 
reducing the cloture requirement from sixty to fifty votes) for 
nominations in 2013 and 2017 raises the possibility of using the 
nuclear option for legislation as well. Majority party senators 
expressed opposition to this in both 2013 and 2017. But  
increasing polarization may dial up the pressure to avoid the 
normal sixty-vote requirements for cloture on legislation. 
For example, Congress must periodically pass legislation 
increasing the debt limit to ensure that the government can pay 
its obligations (such as interest on the debt and Social Security 
benefits).55 Failure to increase the debt limit would cause the 
nation to default; its exchanges of payments would seize up, and 
the government would go into the fiscal equivalent of cardiac 
arrest. The urgency of getting such a “must-pass” bill through the 
Senate might lead to carving out an exception to the cloture 
requirement. Perhaps the Senate majority party could not be 
faulted for doing that, but the “nuclear option” is a slippery slope. 
Using the nuclear option for any legislation at all would 
undermine the deliberation that comes with a sixty-vote 
supermajority cloture requirement. 
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C. Congressional Review Act 
In 1996, Congress enacted the Congressional Review Act 
(CRA) as part of Speaker Newt Gingrich’s ideological program.56  
It allows a bare majority of the Senate (i.e., without sixty votes for 
cloture), together with the House and the President, to disapprove 
recently enacted agency regulations.57 Before 2017,58 it had been 
successfully invoked to disapprove only one regulation.59 It comes 
into play when regulations promulgated at the end of the term of a 
President of one party are subject to disapproval for a few months 
by a Congress and a successor President of the other party. Under 
those circumstances, the Senate can move and pass the 
disapproval action of the prior President’s regulations by a mere 
fifty votes pursuant to the CRA rather than the usual 
supermajority of sixty votes for cloture. 
2017 proved an ideal period for the CRA. President Trump 
longed to demonstrate muscle-flexing in his first hundred days, 
but it would take some time before Congress or even his own 
administrators could produce concrete law-changing action. So 
Congress passed and President Trump signed into law fourteen 
regulatory disapprovals pursuant to the CRA.60 
Some of these regulatory disapprovals have considerable 
significance. Congress used this technique to disapprove, and 
thereby block, the “Stream Protection Rule,” which required coal 
producers that engage in mountaintop removal to restore streams 
once their mining is complete.61 The Interior Department had 
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spent seven years crafting the rule and estimated that it would 
protect 6,000 miles of streams and 52,000 acres of forests.62 
The symbolic significance of the fourteen rule disapprovals 
was even greater than the practical significance. President  
Trump wanted to create an image of activity, but was unable to 
produce serious full-scale executive actions during his first six 
months in office. Moving normal legislation through the 52–48 
Senate (without the CRA’s built-in cloture) was not easy. 
Moreover, his own bureaucracy was understaffed at the top levels, 
and could not conduct the full notice-and-comment procedures, 
including legally strong justifications, to rescind regulations. 
Despite the Trump Administration’s inability to provide elaborate 
administrative preparation and support, Congress’s extensive use 
of CRA disapprovals helped create the impression that President 
Trump was taking action. The CRA (and its failure to require a 
supermajority vote in the Senate) made that possible, fourteen 
times. 
III. MINORITY PARTY STATUS: BENEFITS, BACKGROUND, AND 
UNDERMINING FACTORS 
A. History63 
1. 1975 
The Senate adopted a cloture rule in 1917, and it required 
sixty-seven votes to force the end of a filibuster.  During  the 
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, white supremacist senators used the 
filibuster extensively to block civil rights legislation. From 1949  
to 1975, senators supporting civil rights legislation engaged in 
“the Great Struggle,” fighting to curtail the civil rights filibuster 
so that their bills could go through.64 
In 1975, the Senate lowered the threshold for cloture from 
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two-thirds (sixty-seven votes) to three-fifths (sixty votes). This 
change was the result of a reform effort that was bipartisan, with 
Senate Democrats, strengthened by the 1974 post-Watergate 
election, receiving a forceful and unprecedented ruling from the 
Republican chair, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, who had a 
career-long commitment to civil rights.65 Likely due to the 
bipartisan process that created the 1975 change, it was perceived 
as institutional reform rather than a partisan political power  
grab. The 1975 change was seen as legitimate, and it resulted in 
stability rather than triggering a cascade of further procedural 
changes for partisan advantage. 
Meanwhile, in a little-noticed step, the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974 included a provision called “reconciliation.”66 This 
technique required only a bare majority vote, not a supermajority 
cloture vote, to bring swift action. Reconciliation seemed to apply 
in a narrow set of circumstances: to annually enact deficit- 
reducing provisions in an annual package of limited scope—just 
spending cuts or tax hikes—to make that particular single year’s 
budget stay on target. 
2. 1981 
President Reagan’s 1980 election brought a Senate 
Republican majority, and seemed to constitute an electoral 
mandate.67 The Republican Senate used the  reconciliation  
process to pass an enormous purported cost-savings bill that was 
intended to justify an even more enormous and very real tax- 
cutting bill.68 The bill included several provisions that were 
unrelated  to  the  deficit reduction  process. In  response,  Senator 
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Robert Byrd convinced the Senate to adopt the “Byrd Rule,” 
prohibiting the inclusion of “extraneous” provisions in a 
reconciliation bill.69 As reconciliation has grown in importance, so 
has the reconciliation-limiting Byrd Rule. 
Meanwhile, the ideological divisions within Congress 
gradually became congruent with party lines. Conservative 
Southern Democrats, known as “boll weevils,” had served as a 
centrist swing group, leading to centrist bills as they allied 
alternatively with moderate Democrats to their left or moderate 
Republicans to their right. Over time, conservative Southern 
Democrats were replaced by Southern Republicans.  Another 
group smaller in number, liberal Northern Republicans known as 
“gypsy moths,” was replaced by Northern Democrats. 
The election of 1994 swept in the radical Gingrich Republican 
House majority and a Republican Senate majority, further 
polarizing Congress.70 Gingrich’s changes to House rules in 1995 
reduced the role and independence of committees, which 
previously facilitated the inclusion of centrist minority party  
views through co-sponsorship of some bills and acceptance of some 
amendments. Instead, one-party leadership backed by the 
majority party caucus predominated in the House. In subsequent 
years, as House members gradually won entry into the Senate, 
they brought with them the polarized Gingrich model, inflaming 
the partisan divide within the Senate. 
3. 2001 
In 2001, President George W. Bush won an electoral college 
(but not popular vote) victory and Republicans won a 50–50 
majority in the Senate.71 Even though this was not much of a 
mandate, it started a six-year period of “Republican Revolution,” 
foreshadowing something like “one-party rule.” The Republican 
party held both chambers and the presidency, but it held the 
Senate sometimes by only a very narrow margin. For the Senate 
Republican party to accomplish its goals, they would have to 
circumvent   or   overcome   the   extant   parliamentary restraints 
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requiring a supermajority.72 Their success in achieving  those 
goals was somewhat at odds with the “gridlock” thesis (i.e., that 
Congress could no longer pass much legislation because of the 
strong barriers to action, especially in the Senate).73 
Despite having only a bare 50–50 Republican majority in the 
Senate, Republicans were able to enact enormous tax cuts in 2001 
thanks to extreme and outsized use of reconciliation.74 They used 
reconciliation to do precisely the opposite of the deficit reduction 
intended by the original Congressional Budget Act. They 
accomplished this by using special new reconciliation techniques, 
such as a “sunset”75 provision on enormous tax cuts that 
nominally ended after nine years.76 
Another 2001 event that was little noticed was the Senate 
Majority Leader’s sacking of the Senate parliamentarian.77 The 
parliamentarian has significant responsibility, including advising 
the Senate chair on how to rule on whether a motion is in order 
and whether a proposed provision is consistent with 
reconciliation.78 The parliamentarian is expected to interpret and 
apply Senate rules without fear or favor, and the parliamentarian 
is not supposed to be threatened or fired for the inevitable rulings 
that go against the majority. In 2001, the parliamentarian was 
fired after expressing views about reconciliation that were 
contrary to what the majority party wanted. 
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4. 2003–16 and the Gang of 14 
Judicial nominations followed a curious course during the 
2003–2006 period.79 Senate Democrats feared that if  they  
dragged their feet on controversial Supreme Court nominations, 
Republicans would use the nuclear option.80 To avoid that, Senate 
moderates from both parties, nicknamed the “Gang of 14,” struck 
a deal.81 The minority agreed not to use the filibuster for judicial 
nominations unless there were “extraordinary” circumstances, and 
the majority agreed not to use the “nuclear option.”82 Looked at 
one way, this period prefigured the slide into use of the nuclear 
option for non-Supreme Court judicial nominations in 2013–2017. 
Looked at another way, the fact that moderates from both parties 
could strike a deal provides a precedent for how a future Senate 
could make procedural peace on a range of subjects without 
completely suppressing the minority party and thus denying all 
deliberation. 
In 2009–2010, a Democratic President, House, and Senate 
had a strong electoral mandate and passed several enormously 
important laws. Perhaps most important, they enacted the ACA, 
sometimes referred to as “Obamacare.”83 The ACA marked an 
important moment in reconciliation. Initially, in 2009, key 
majority senators successfully opposed reconciliation, arguing that 
this subject matter was too deserving of deliberation to have its 
consideration truncated through the reconciliation process.84 The 
bill made its way through the Senate, backed by a sixty-senator 
Democratic majority, and thus could be defeated by filibuster if 
even a single majority senator defected. Senate consideration was 
grueling for the majority (and infuriating for the minority), but it 
was a triumph for working the old-fashioned way, without 
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reconciliation and without short-circuiting deliberation. 
However, in 2010, the Democratic majority lost its sixtieth 
senator after a Republican won a vacancy election.85 The House 
had adopted a different version of the ACA, and in order for the 
ACA to become law, the Senate had to pass a compromise version. 
Now one vote short of the sixty-vote supermajority needed for 
ordinary legislation, the Senate majority brought the compromise 
version back as a reconciliation bill, reducing the needed vote tally 
from sixty to fifty votes.86 Republicans would later point to this 
precedent in order to justify their use of reconciliation in an 
attempt to repeal the ACA. 
During President Obama’s two terms, Republicans 
filibustered many judicial nominees, some executive nominees, 
and many bills as well. At one point the Senate majority and 
minority negotiated a deal to limit filibusters, but that 
accomplished little. As described above, Senate Majority Leader 
Reid carried out his threat to use the nuclear option in 2013 for all 
executive and judicial positions except the Supreme Court.87 
Minority Leader McConnell warned that the time would come 
when the shoe was on the other foot, accurately predicting that he 
would eventually use the nuclear option, as he did in 2017. 
5. 2016 Election 
The 2016 election recreated the same configuration as the 
2000 election: a Republican President elected by a minority of 
voters and a Republican House and Senate. As in 2000, the 2016 
election did not, by any stretch of the imagination, provide the 
Republican Senate with an electoral mandate for one-party action. 
As the Senate had been 50–50 in 2001, so it was 52–48 in 2017.88 
Traditionally, such small Senate majorities necessitated a degree 
of bipartisanship to enact legislation. In order to get to the 
supermajority of sixty votes required for overcoming determined 
resistance by a large faction of the minority, a President would 
need eight senators from the minority party. There was precedent 
for reaching across party lines in order to obtain sixty votes. 
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President Clinton made multiple bipartisan trade and welfare 
deals with a Republican Congress in order to obtain centrist 
results such as NAFTA.89 Going this route would require some 
Democratic votes for Republican-backed legislation. 
Both President Bush and President Trump were elected by a 
minority of the voters. Both sought massive tax cuts that would  
be regressive in structure and impact.90 In key  respects,  
President Trump had a far more ambitious agenda. Initially, he 
hoped to “repeal and replace” the ACA, cut taxes, slash spending 
on programs for the poor, and enact an infrastructure program.  
He succeeded in enacting an enormous tax-cut bill, slashing 
corporate rates, ending key middle class deductions, and ending 
the health insurance individual mandate that meant 13 million 
insureds would lose coverage.91 The plan was to use reconciliation 
for these legislative changes that are significantly programmatic, 
including shrinking regulatory agencies like the Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
B. Benefits of Avoiding One-Party Rule 
It is worthwhile to address why there is any demerit at all in 
procedures that overcome gridlock. Much of the commentary on 
this issue has either asserted or assumed that gridlock is 
uniformly reprehensible, and that long-standing barriers to 
enactment that are rooted in a minority party role should be 
removed whenever possible.92 Such an approach may seem 
particularly attractive after several Congresses have come and 
gone without passing any important legislation. 
Despite the barriers to action, in 2009 Congress was able to 
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pass a major agenda over minority resistance: a trillion-dollar 
stimulus bill, the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, and, above all, 
the ACA. It also passed other significant bills over vigorous 
minority resistance, such as legislation giving the FDA the 
authority to regulate tobacco products. This was  not  gridlock. 
The 2008 election provided a national mandate, making it possible 
to move beyond the gridlock. 
Even during times of relative gridlock, such as 2007–2008 and 
2011–2016, Congress managed to pass annual appropriations 
bills.93 When these appropriations bills ran into difficulty, 
Congress resorted to simpler and less specific continuing 
resolutions. In other years, Congress enacted fully-detailed 
appropriations, complete with policy riders. These appropriations 
bills constitute legislative action, deciding not just spending, but 
also policy. For example, Congress blocked Obama’s key initiative 
to close Guantanamo through an appropriations bill. 
During the Obama Administration, Congress enacted other 
bills, including the extension of tax cuts and spending caps. So 
congressional action or inaction during 2007–2016 was not an all- 
or-nothing proposition. The role of the minority party in the 
Senate during this time period effected a balance, however crude, 
between inaction on major legislation and action on 
appropriations and lesser bills. Congressional achievements 
during the Obama Administration include a few pieces of 
substantial legislation (e.g., the ACA and Dodd-Frank) which were 
enacted while the President’s party controlled both houses of 
Congress, along with significant enactments relatively narrow in 
scope that were attached to appropriations bills. 
When changes in Senate procedure decrease the role for 
deliberation, there is an increased risk of one-party rule. Some of 
our most significant legislative achievements were made possible 
when the President’s party had a supermajority in the Senate 
and/or other manifestations of a strong electoral mandate. A 
classic example occurred in the mid-1960s after the national 
election mandate of 1964 led to enactment of President Johnson’s 
“Great Society” program (notwithstanding very strong 
conservative barriers in the Senate).94 Other electoral mandates 
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occurred in 1980 (with the election of Ronald Reagan) and in 1992 
(with the election of Bill Clinton). 
The most recent electoral mandate on this scale occurred in 
2008. Democratic candidate Obama won the Presidency by nine 
million votes, and the Democratic majority in the Senate reached 
sixty seats. Initially, Obama was able to pursue a strong 
legislative program and get his nominees confirmed without using 
either the nuclear option or reconciliation (except for the final 
round of ACA enactment). 
The election of 2016 contrasted sharply with those of 1964 
and 2008, and did not result in the same kind of national electoral 
mandate. Republican candidate Trump received three million 
fewer votes than his Democratic rival, winning the Presidency 
only due to the odd math of the Electoral College.95 In the Senate, 
Republicans had only a narrow 52–48 majority, well short of 
President Obama’s 60–40 majority after the 2008 election. 
Moreover, President Trump has not proven himself to be an 
effective leader of Congress the way that Johnson, Reagan, and 
Obama did. Thus, the majority party’s drive for major legislative 
accomplishments in 2017 lacked a strong national electoral 
mandate to support it. 
C. Polarization and Other Factors 
Certain powerful causes have driven these developments in 
Congress. First comes national polarization.96 In the past, more 
states served as Senate swing states. For example, up to the 
1980s, parts of the South had strong historic ties to strongly 
conservative Democrats who often voted like conservative 
Republicans.97 Similarly, in the past, parts of the Northeast had 
historic ties to moderate Republicans. But, competition came from 
Democrats, increasingly tied to national Democratic figures more 
in tune with the regional views. In today’s vocabulary, the 
Northeast is “blue,” leaning Democratic in Senate elections.98 
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89 (2018). 
96. THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 6–7. 
97. BYRON E. SHAFER & RICHARD JOHNSTON, THE END OF SOUTHERN 
EXCEPTIONALISM: CLASS, RACE, AND PARTISAN CHANGE IN THE POSTWAR SOUTH 
137 (Harvard University Press, 2006). 
98. Id. at 191. 
 2019] ONE-PARTY RULE 71 
 
Moreover, the political party has become less ideologically 
diverse, and on average has moved from the center toward 
opposite ideological poles. During the 1970s, the most significant 
division in the Senate was ideological rather than party-based. 
There was a “conservative coalition”—conservative Democrats 
who teamed up with Republicans (other than moderate 
Republicans from the North).99 Regardless of whether Democrats 
or Republicans were in the majority, the conservative coalition 
controlled powerful institutional structures in the Senate. 
Committees had much greater power at that time than they do 
today, and committee chairs were appointed based on seniority.100 
As a result, conservative Democrats held a disproportionate share 
of those committee chairs. To preserve their institutional power, 
those conservative Democratic committee chairs would sometimes 
bend their actions toward the choices of the national Democratic 
Party as a whole. Hence, during Democratic majorities, the 
chamber generally took a moderate position, balancing the 
preferences of conservatives who held institutional power with the 
preferences of moderates and liberals who outnumbered 
conservatives. 
In contrast, the modern Senate is highly polarized along party 
lines. When the Senate considered the ACA in 2009, no 
Republicans voted in support. Eight years later, when Senate 
Republicans sought to repeal the ACA, no Democrats voted in 
support. When the Senate moved to the “nuclear option” 
(removing the supermajority requirement) in 2013 for most 
nominations and in 2017 for Supreme Court nominations, the 
decisive procedural votes were along party lines. 
Similarly, when the Senate uses the reconciliation process to 
enact key bills, senators vote largely along party lines, with the 
majority party voting in favor of the reconciliation process and the 
minority party voting against. With tax cut legislation, some 
members of the minority party cross party lines to vote with the 
majority on final passage. But at an earlier critical stage, when 
the issue on amendments is precisely how the tax rate changes 
will favor the wealthy, those votes largely fall along party lines. 
The process of ideological polarization has gained momentum 
 
99. THE POLARIZED CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 6. 
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along path-dependent lines.101 The Senate maintains a sharp 
procedural distinction between its two types of business: 
legislation and confirmations.102 In 2013, when the Senate 
removed the supermajority requirement to confirm executive 
branch and lower-court nominees, it reinforced the distinction 
between legislation and confirmations by maintaining the 
supermajority cloture requirement for legislation. Four years 
later, in 2017, the Senate removed the supermajority requirement 
for Supreme Court nominees, but did not remove the 
supermajority requirement for enacting legislation.103 The 
established line between legislation and confirmations made that 
a natural stopping point.104 
Another path dependent feature is the distinction between 
annual appropriations bills and general fiscal legislation. Senate 
rules ease passage of appropriations bills by prohibiting 
amendment of such bills with “legislation” (i.e., provisions that 
make policy rather than appropriating specific amounts of 
money).105 This limitation speeds passage of appropriations bills 
by avoiding the controversies over policy that can slow down 
legislation. There has been no attempt to adopt appropriations 
through the reconciliation mechanism. If an appropriation bill 
cannot pass, the Senate instead passes a continuing resolution, 
which extends the previous year’s spending levels. Neither party 
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gets the change in direction that it would want. While this may be 
a suboptimal way to govern, it ensures relative stability.106 
The discussion up to this point warrants a question few have 
asked. What practical benefits accrue from preventing a party 
with a majority but not an electoral mandate from pushing its own 
ideological agenda through the Senate? The literature critiquing 
gridlock seems to imply that a majority party should be able to 
push through its agenda on a one-party basis even when it lacks a 
sizable electoral mandate. 
D. Principles 
The benefits of promoting deliberation and avoiding one-party 
rule fall into three categories: legitimacy, rationality, and 
balance.107 As to legitimacy, we must distinguish technical 
constitutional legitimacy from democratic legitimacy in terms of 
political theory. A bill pushed through the Senate using the 
reconciliation procedure (or, in the future, the nuclear option) 
would have technical constitutional legitimacy if it also passes the 
House and is signed into law by the President. That would satisfy 
Article I, section 7, clause 2, achieving technical constitutional 
legitimacy even if the predominant sentiment in the country 
opposed the bill. 
However, a bill pushed through the Senate using the 
reconciliation procedure or the nuclear option may well lack 
democratic legitimacy. Even after enactment, most of the public 
may oppose the law. The public may express that predominant 
sentiment through hostile polls, at angry public demonstrations 
and town halls, in harshly reactive regular and social media, and 
by engaging in counter-activity at the state and local level. If the 
issue is sufficiently salient, the next election or two could result in 
enough congressional support for repeal, making it possible to roll 
back the legislation or at least limit its implementation. The 
struggles over pushing through and later repealing such 
legislation can chew up and swallow a large share of the nation’s 
stock of time, attention, and political consensus. 
Deliberation may also increase the rationality of resulting 
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legislation. At least some of the time, wisdom, and stability in the 
eyes of a diverse country may lie in the middle of the political 
spectrum. This tendency to favor a middle (rather than extreme) 
path can be found in the record of appropriations bills, responsible 
for the country’s overall federal spending (apart from entitlements 
like Medicare). Appropriations do change with changes in 
congressional majority parties, but the shifts are not nearly as 
profound as the more partisan parts of party agendas. 
Procedural rules facilitate a relatively stable level of 
appropriations, and bipartisan congressional sentiment favors 
stability in appropriations. Appropriations last only one year, and 
hence need annual passage. This necessary pattern of regular 
passage promotes continuing steady bipartisan compromise and 
support, facilitating gradual adaptation to political change. 
Changes to appropriations tend to be moderate, different from 
substantive legislation that bursts forth on a particular subject at 
comparatively long intervals. The procedures for appropriations 
are a long-term expression of a bipartisan congressional sentiment 
favoring stable support for annual action. This, in turn, reflects a 
judgment that the wise and rational approach for appropriations 
requires stability and centrism. 
A third benefit is balance. The system of checks and balances 
is meant to prevent the accumulation of undue power. The 
Senate’s supermajority cloture requirement is not technically part 
of the constitutional system of checks and balances.108 The 
Senate’s traditional stance against one-party, bare-majority rule is 
similarly necessary for the system of checks and balances. 
Without the supermajority requirements, radical shifts of 
direction come too quickly. One party had a bare majority in the 
Senate in early 2001, then lost that majority in mid-2001, and won 
it back again in early 2003. If a bare majority could freely pursue 
its agenda, that would produce dizzying shifts in where the 
legislative ship is heading. Costly triumphs of interest groups 
rooted in a single party would alternate frequently between 
achieving victory and being vanquished, undermining the 
country’s stability. 
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The absence of an electoral mandate should be understood to 
mean that a majority of the country does not want the extreme 
policies that result from one-party rule. When a bare legislative 
majority can exercise great power without accommodating the 
minority’s concerns, a substantial plurality of people, if not a 
majority, are likely to feel alienated from the government. 
IV. CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FOR PROGRESS 
The Senate has the ability to change its rules and procedures 
in order to produce a more balanced, less polarizing legislative 
process. When the majority party can exert its will unilaterally, 
the minority party experiences a kind of powerlessness. The goal 
should be to give the majority party enough of an incentive to 
pursue a centrist alliance with members of the minority party that 
it would forego the cruder approach of pushing bills and nominees 
through on a one-party basis. For this approach to work, the rules 
must give members of the minority party some power of 
procedural resistance. This can be accomplished by tweaking the 
supermajority requirement so that the majority party has a  
reason to mine the minority party for support. 
For example, the Senate could reinstate a supermajority 
cloture requirement for confirmation of Supreme Court Justices in 
exchange for the Senate minority party promise to filibuster 
nominees only if there are “extraordinary circumstances.” This 
concept—including this specific language—comes from the 2005 
“Gang of 14” compromise.109 In concrete terms, it would mean  
that the current Senate majority would need a supermajority to 
confirm a nominee who would shift the ideological balance of the 
Supreme Court. 
A more challenging measure would be to make it easier—but 
not too much easier—for the majority to pass legislation without 
resorting to the nuclear option or reconciliation. One way to do 
that would be to lower the threshold for cloture below the current 
sixty votes, but only if some of the votes for cloture come from the 
minority party.110 For example, the cloture threshold could be 
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lowered to fifty-seven votes, as long as those fifty-seven include at 
least five votes from the minority party, giving the majority party 
an incentive to negotiate sufficiently centrist legislation to win  
five senators from the minority party.111 This way, a majority 
party that held less than sixty seats could weaken—rather than 
destroy—the supermajority requirement, without sinking to the 
nuclear option.112 
Another possible compromise would involve changing the 
rules for reconciliation, allowing the majority party to use 
reconciliation for largely non-fiscal bills, such as health care, but 
permitting the minority party to offer relevant but non-germane 
proposals as amendments. The reconciliation process does not 
permit robust debate through consideration of minority 
amendments, making it inappropriate for complex and important 
legislation like healthcare reform. Health care entitlements, such 
as Medicare and Medicaid, will need legislative reforms in years to 
come as the population ages and health care costs rise. In light of 
Democrats using reconciliation in 2010 for the last vote on the 
ACA and Republicans attempting to use it to repeal the ACA in 
2017, the Senate is unlikely to bar use of reconciliation for future 
healthcare reform. But the Senate could legitimize  the health 
care reform process and strengthen its ability to deliberate on 
such legislation by allowing the minority to offer additional kinds 
of amendments. 
More broadly, the Senate needs to create incentives for 
members of both parties to become open to supporting compromise 
proposals and centrist bills from the other party. For example, 
centrists in the majority party could withhold support for cloture 
for a reasonable time, facilitating an open procedure before a bill 
nears final passage. Conversely, centrists in the minority party 
could offer support for cloture after a reasonable time, recognizing 
that they have had an opportunity to shape or moderate the bill. 
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This could provide a path for centrists in both the majority and 
minority parties to seek compromise. 
Senators may be reluctant to step away from bright-line all- 
or-nothing action. Majority party senators may be reluctant to 
give up the power provided by one-party rule. Minority party 
senators may be reluctant to give up their remaining ability to rail 
against the majority party agenda. 
Repeated moves toward one-party rule have diminished the 
Senate’s ability to deliberate on significant legislative changes. 
The Senate can reinvigorate its deliberative role by restoring— 
and adjusting—its requirement of a supermajority. It can keep 
changing in a new and different way.  We need it to.  Let us hope 
it will. 
